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REJECTION OR REVOCATION
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
In a normal single delivery sales contract under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code' the buyer's obligation to accept and pay for goods (unless other-
wise agreed) is dependent upon a conforming tender of delivery,2 which
requires placing conforming goods at the disposition of the buyer and giv-
ing him notice.3 Goods are conforming when they are in accord with the
terms of the contract.4  Most contracts for the sale of goods are entered
into and routinely performed without controversy; but what happens when
the tender or the goods are not "conforming"? Under the Code the buyer,
faced with a tender of non-conforming goods, has three options: (1) he
can accept and retain the goods, 5 (2) he can reject the goods and thus not
be liable for the price,6 or (3) he can accept the goods and then later re-
voke his acceptance and defend an action for price.' It is with these last
two courses of action that this note will be concerned.
While both options seem to be much the same, at least as to result,
there are important differences between them.8 The result of these dif-
ferences could mean defeat to a buyer who is defending a seller's action for
the price of the goods on a breach of warranty theory as occurred in the
case of Aliron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc.' There the plaintiff Miron had
sold a horse at an auction held by the defendant Raceway to the defendant
Finkelstein'0 who purchased the horse with an express warranty that it was
sound. There was also a term in the contract of sale which limited any
warranty made to a 24-hour period.1 Finkelstein removed the horse and
early the next morning his trainer discovered the horse was favoring its
left hind leg. Upon examination it was discovered the horse had a broken
splint bone.1 Finkelstein immediately notified the Raceway that the horse
was not sound but return of the horse was refused. The seller, Miron,
I UIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1962 official text) [hereinafter cited as the UCC].
2UCC § 2-507.
3UCC § 2-503.
4 UCC § 2-106(2).
5UCC § 2-601.
8 UCC § 2-602.
7 UCC § 2-608.
8 Barnes, The Sales Contract - Buyer's Remedies, 49 MARQ. L REV. 122 (1965).
9 400 F.2d 112 (2nd Cir. 1968).
10 Henceforth all references to the defendant will mean the defendant Finkelstein.
21400 F.2d 112, 114.
122A splint bone is a small bone in a horses leg. It is actually the vestige of earlier toes on the
horse. It is below the hock bone on the horse's hind legs and runs along the main leg bone to
the ankle. It is tied to the leg bone by ligaments. It varies in diameter from approximately 1
inch at the top to about Vs inch at the bottom. It is relatively easy to fracture in comparison
with the main leg bone, and could be fractured by being struck by a hoof while the horse is run-
ning or trotting.
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then filed suit against Finkelstein for the price of the horse. The trial
court found for the plaintiff, holding that the horse was sound when sold
and thus the defendant was liable for the price.13 The Court of Appeals
affirmed on the basis that the buyer had not carried the burden of proof
necessary to win a favorable judgment.14 The defendant lost because he
failed to prove that the horse was not as warrented at the time of the sale.
The shifting of the burden of proof from the seller to the buyer is one of
the results of the differences between revocation of acceptance and rejec-
tion under the Code. Besides shifting the burden of proof, the distinction
between rejection and revocation has other effects. This note will attempt
to focus on the distinction between the two courses of action and the re-
sults of that distinction.
To understand rejection and revocation one must first comprehend
what constitutes acceptance of the goods under the Code, since rejection
precludes acceptance and revocation can occur only after the goods have
been accepted. Acceptance is governed by section 2-606 which specifies
that acceptance occurs:
(1) When the buyer, after a reasonable opportunity to inspect signifies
to the seller that the goods are conforming or, if not conforming,
that he will still retain them.15
(2) When the buyer fails to make an effective rejection after a reason-
able opportunity to inspect.'
(3) Where the buyer does any act inconsistent with the seller's owner-
ship of the goods.17
Thus when goods are shipped that do not conform to the contract, the
buyer may accept or reject them; his decision will be affected by many
things, the extent of the non-conformity, the market, his relationship with
the seller, trade practices and other factors' if he chooses to accept, he must
do so in one of the ways provided for in section 2-606. The first method
(signifying acceptance to the seller) is not too complex, the buyer can
signify acceptance by several courses of action. The comments to the
Code suggest that one way is payment of the price; 9 another way would
be a letter to the effect that the buyer was accepting the goods. It is clear
that the notice required to signify acceptance need be less formal than the
notice required for a rejection.20 The second method will be discussed
13400 F.2d 112, 113-14.
14 400 F.2d 112.
15UCC § 2-606(1)(a).
161d. (1)(b).
17 Id. (1) (C).
Is Symposium, The Uniform Commercial Code and Contract Law: Some Selected Problems,
105 U. PA. L REv. 836, 864-80 (1957).
19 UCC § 2-606, Comment 3.
20 Manfredi v. Fertes Inc., 352 Mass. 775, 226 N.E.2d 365 (1967); Babcock Poultry Farm,
Inc. v. Shook, 204 Pa. Super. 141, 203 A.2d 399 (1964).
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later in the discussion of how an effective rejection is made. The last
method, (the doing of an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership)
is more involved. The courts usually talk of exercising dominion over the
goods in some manner.21 It has been held for instance that putting a new
bed on a truck was acceptance in one case;22 keeping the goods for an
unreasonable length of time, or continuing to accept future deliveries may
also constitute acceptance.2 Custody of the goods does not constitute ac-
ceptance in all cases however, since the buyer has a "reasonable"2 4 oppor-
tunity to inspect the goodsY5
It is dear that for the buyer to avoid accepting the non-conforming
goods, he must make an effective rejection,2 otherwise he will be deemed
to have accepted. Thus an important difference between rejection and
revocation is the time in the sequence of events at which they occur. Re-
jection forecloses any possibility of acceptance of the goods, while revoca-
tion can occur only after the goods have been accepted.
The elements of an effective rejection are outlined by section 2-602(1).
There are two requirements for an effective rejection: 1) it must occur
within a reasonable 28 time and 2) the seller must be seasonably29 notified.
Once a buyer has effectively and rightfully rejected the tender, he cannot
be held to have accepted nor to have obtained possession.30 Rejection is an
easier remedy for the buyer to use than is revocation. To give buyer the
right to reject the whole delivery (in a single delivery contract) any defect
is enough; in the words of the Code, "if the goods or the tender of delivery
fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may (a) reject
the whole. ."31 Not only will a defect in the goods allow rejection, but
a defect in the tender of the goods will also allow the buyer to reject. In
addition the defect need not be major, the Code says "in any respect."
21Mazur Bros. v. Jaffe Fish Co., 3 UCC Rep. 419 (Veterans Admin. Contract Appeals
Board 1965); Marbelite Co. v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. Super. 256, 222 A.2d 443 (1966); F. W.
Lang Co. v. Fleet, 193 Pa. Super. 365, 165 A.2d 258 (1960).
22 Park County Implement Co. v. Craig, 397 P.2d 800 (Wyo. 1964).
2
-
3 General Foods Corp. v. Bittinger Co., 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 282 (C. P. 1963); BoMyte Co. v.
L-Co. Cabinet Corp., 40 Northumberland Legal J. 172 (Pa. C. P. 1968); Sal Metal Products, Co.
v. Rennert, 5 UCC Rep. 826 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
24Definitions of "Reasonable Time" cover over 50 pages and 160 categories in VoL 36
Words and Phrases.
25UCC § 2-606(1)(a).
26UCC § 2-606(1)(b).
27 Hudspeth Motors v. Wilkinson, 238 Ark. 410, 382 S. W.2d. 191 (1964).
28UCC § 1-204(2).
2 1UCC § 1-204(3).
30 Phalan, Uniform Commercial Code-Sales-Suammary of Buyer's Remedies, 16 U. PiTr.
L REV. 209 (1955).
31 UCC § 2-601; '"The general rule is that if there is any defect in the seller's tender or deliv-
ery (2-503).... the buyer is entitled to reject (2-601). Therefore until cure (2-508) or accept-
ance (2.606), the risk remains on the seller." Mahon, Remedies in Sales Disputes Under the
Uniform Commercial Code-Notes for the Litigator, 31 FODHAM L REV. 727, 737-38 (1963).
1970]
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Thus in a contract for delivery of 20 wickets at 2:00 p.m. on the fifth; a
tender at 2:01 p.m. gives the buyer the right to reject the same as if only 15
wickets were tendered or 20 broken ones were offered.32
In order to be proper, a rejection must be made within a reasonable
time. In a case where the buyer had kept a truck for 5 months before the
engine blew up, the court held he had not rejected within a reasonable
time.33 In another case where the buyer's new car traveled only a few
blocks and then ceased to run, the court held there was no acceptance and
that buyer had made an effective rejection.34 It becomes clear that reason-
able time will depend on the facts of each particular case, or it could con-
ceivably be fixed by the parties' agreement.3 5 Reasonable time will vary
depending on how hard the defect is to discover and will usually be a
question for the jury.36 The reasonable time requirement in the Code can
present problems; however, had the Code set a certain number of days in
the place of a reasonable time, the problems would have been greater.
Since what is a reasonable time is a jury question,37 this provision of the
Code allows the trier of fact to review the particular circumstances and
reach a fair result in the case before it. Concomitant with this idea is the
one that a latent defect, or one not readily discoverable, will not require as
prompt a notice as will a patent or obvious defect.38 The Miron case makes
this last point when it states that "Finkelstein failed to make an effective
rejection of the horse under U.C.C. § 2-602(1) thereby accepting it under
subsection (b) (of 2-606);' '39 impliedly at least the court is saying this
defect should have been noticed immediately after the sale and the delay,
even though less than 24 hours, was unreasonable.
The second element required for an effective rejection is a seasonable
notice to the seller. Failure to give such a notice will bar the buyer from
any remedy40 and he will be held to have accepted the goods regardless of
32 This may be an overstatement or extreme example since UCC § 1-203 imposes a require-
ment of good faith. There are also provisions allowing the seller to cure certain defects; UCC
§ 2-508, see Barnes, supra note 8.
33 Hudspeth Motors v. Wilkinson, 238 Ark. 410, 382 S.W.2d 191 (1964).
34 Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N. J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (L. Div. 1968).
35 See Barnes, supra note 8.
36 Trailmobile Div. of Pullman, Inc. v. Jones, 118 Ga. App. 472, 164 S. E.2d 346 (1968);
Pierson v. Crooks, 115 N. Y. 539, 22 N. E. 349 (1889); Rawsilk Trading Co. v. Kaltenbach &
Stephens, Inc, 199 App. Div. 799, 192 N. Y. S. 375 (1922); Vandenberg v. Siter, 204 Pa.
Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964); Schneider v. Person, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 10, 30 Lehigh L. J.
416 (C. P. 1964); Annot, 52 A. L. R.2d 900, 907-920 (1957).
37 See, cases cited in note 36 supra.
38 1ngle v. Marked Tree Equip. Co., 244 Ark. 1166, 428 S. W.2d 286 (1968); Zabriskie
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N. J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (L. Div. 1968); Berlin & Co. v. T.
Whiting Mfg., 5 UCC RP. 357 (N. Y. Sup. Ct 1968); Vandenberg v. Siter, 204, Pa. Super.
392,204 A.2d 494 (1964). See also Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, 400 F.2d 112 (2nd Cir. 1968),
UCC § 2-602 Comment 1.
39400 F.2d at 118.
40 UCC § 2-602; Shreve v. Casto Trailer Sales, Inac, 150 W. Va. 669, 149 S. E2d 238
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their non-conformity. 41 The notice requirement is in two parts: 1) the
adequacy of the notice, and 2) the delivery of the notice within a season-
able time. The purpose of the notice in the case of rejection is to give the
seller some indication that a problem exists with respect to the goods de-
livered. This is to allow the seller to cure or make some arrangement to
protect his interest in the goods. The Code does not indicate the exact
words needed to constitute adequate notice, but it is clear that the notice
need only alert the seller that there is something wrong.42 Thus almost
anything will serve as an adequate notice; and in fact courts seem almost
to ignore the wording of the notice.43 In one case a notice consisting of a
letter, drafted by plaintiff's attorney, stating plaintiff's name, the date of
his injuries, the product causing those injuries and that they were purchased
at defendant's store and were unfit for human consumption without any
further explanation was held to be sufficient.44
While the necessary wording of a notice is somewhat flexible; the ele-
ment of timeliness of delivery is not. The Code demands that notice be
given seasonably to the seller if it is to be effective.45 Seasonableness, like
reasonableness, is a jury question.46 In the cases decided, the factual pat-
tern is of utmost importance in determining whether the notice given was
seasonable. For example, in one case the plaintiff ate a pork dinner and
became ill, he sent notice of the injury to the restaurant 32 days later. A
request by the defendant that the court rule 32 days not a reasonable time
was denied, and the denial was upheld by the Appellate Court.47  In do-
ing so the court said, "Whether notice... has been given within a reason-
able time depends not only on the time that has elapsed... but on circum-
stances embracing the plaintiff's ability to give such notice.. ."4 In an-
other case where the plaintiff was injured by an exploding pop bottle, she
gave notice to the supplier within 4 months, but took 12 months to notify
the seller. The court held the notice to the seller was not within a reason-
able time, and that the reasonableness of the 4-month delay in giving notice
to the supplier was a question for the jury.49 As the difficulty in discover-
ing the non-conformity increases so also does the time in which notice will
remain seasonable. For this reason a set time limitation in the contract
(1966); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N. W.2d 55 (1967); Bailey, Sales Warranties,
Products Liability and the UCC: A Lab Analysis of the Cases, 4 WILLAMHL= L. J. 291 (1967).
41 J. C. Cohen Salvage Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 205 Pa. Super. 26, 206 A.2d 331
(1965).
42UCC § 2-607, Comment 4.
43 Manfredi v. Fettes, Inc., 352 Mass. 775, 226 N. E.2d 365 (1967).
4 4 Nugent v. Popular Markets, Inc., 353 Mass. 45, 228 N. E.2d 91 (1967).
4 5UCC § 2-602(1).
4G See text accompanying note 37, supra.
4 7 Downey v. Mahoney, 25 Mass. App. Dec. 196 (1962).
481d. at 198-99.
49 San Antonio v. Warwick Club Ginger Ale Co., - R. I. -, 248 A.2d 778 (1968).
19701
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may be set aside if it is not a reasonable time in which to discover certain
defects. " The Code's use of reasonable makes the question one for the
jury and allows it to reach a just and fair result."
If the buyer has accepted the goods, he is not without remedy under the
Code any more than he would be under the general law of contracts.
Under the common law the buyer could rescind the contract under certain
conditions,52 the Code term for this action is revocation of acceptance
which avoids the use of the word recission which has several different
meanings.53
The Code has introduced a new concept of revocation of acceptance in
place of the former theory of rescission (with its varying meanings) and
has added the rule that a buyer may revoke and also claim damages.54
The Code contemplates the return of the purchase price to the buyer when
he has justifiedly revoked acceptance.5 5 The buyer had a similar course of
action available under the Uniform Sales Act; where one of the remedies
provided was for the buyer to rescind the contract and return or offer to
return the goods.5 6 The Uniform Sales Act however did not clearly decide
the effect of accepting non-conforming goods and there existed a good
deal of confusion. It seemed as though the buyer's suit for breach of war-
ranty would survive his acceptance if he gave reasonable notice of the
breach to the seller.
One important distinction between rejection and revocation is the ex-
tent of the defect required. To reject, any breach in either the tender or
the goods themselves is sufficient; this is not true with revocation. For the
buyer to revoke his acceptance the defect involved must "substantially im-
50 Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649 (W. D. Pa. 1968); Wilson
Trading Co. v. David Ferguson Ltd., 23 N. Y.2d 398, 244 N. E.2d 685, 297 N. Y. S.2d 108
(1968); Vandenberg v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964).
51 See cases cited in note 50 supra; see also, Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d
585 (8th Cir. 1964); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3rd Cir. 1961);
Schneider v. Person, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 10, 30 Lehigh L J. 416 (C. P. 1964).52 See 5A CORBIN, CoNRACTs, § 1236 (1964); Lawner v. Engelbach, 433 Pa. 311, 249
A.2d 295 (1969).
53 See Murray, The Consumer and the Code: A Cross-Sectional View, 23 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 11 (1968).
54 Murray, supra, note 53 at 40; see also Spies, Article 2: Breach Repudiation and Excuse, 30
Mo. L REV. 225 (1965).
55 UCC § 2-711(1).
5 6 Uniform Sales Act § 69(1)(d) (1950); for a discussion of this point, see Nordstrom,
Restitution on Default and Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 VAND. L REV.
1143, 1173-78 (1966).
57 Uniform Sales Act § 69(1)(a)(b) and § 69(3) (1950); Knobel v. J. Bartel Co., 176 Wis.
393, 187 N. W. 188 (1922); Aaron Bodek & Son v. Avrach, 297 Pa. 225, 146 A. 546 (1929).
See also, Comment, The Uniform Commercial Code v. Existing Law as to the Buyer's Rights On
Improper Delivery of Goods, 37 MARQ. L. REV. 171 (1953); Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform
Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 281 (1961);
Schaffer, Sales Warranties in Illinois: Commercial Code and Pre-Code Law, 39 CHI.-KENr L
REV. 93 (1962); Sutton, Sales Warranties Under the Sale of Goods Act and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 6 M.U.L.R. 150 (1967).
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pair its (the goods') value to him [emphasis added.1'" 8 This is not the
only requirement for an effective revocation, but it is the first one the buyer
must satisfy. By substantial, the Code means a defect which is not readily
repairable or so very basic to the contract, that its lack or malfunctioning
causes the buyer to lose a substantial portion of the value of the bargain."'
Thus a loose drive shaft that causes an automobile to be noisy, but which
can be fixed in a few minutes is not a substantial enough defect to allow
the buyer to revoke.60 However, the seller is not allowed to continue mak-
ing numerous minor repairs for an unlimited time. Thus defects in a car
which caused it to be shopped for repairs 30 times in one year constituted
a breach substantial enough to allow revocation. 61  In Campbell v. Pol-
lack, 2 the contract was for a sale of a car washing business. When the
buyer did not receive the heating equipment he attempted to get his money
returned. In answer to the defendants assertion, that lack of heating
equipment was not a substantial defect, the court replied:
... [T]he car-wash business is a year round activity. Heat and adequate
lighting play an important part in the efficient operation of any such en-
terprise. A car-wash establishment in the middle of winter in Rhode Is-
land without heat and light would be a strange place indeed.6
Since any minor defect or non-conforming tender will allow the buyer to
reject, it is much easier for him to reject then it is for him to accept and
then later attempt to revoke that acceptance under section 2-608."
It is not enough that the defect is substantial, as more is required by
the Code. The next requirement under 2-608 is that the buyer when he
accepted, either did not know of the defect, or if knowing, accepted on
the reasonable assumption that the non-conformity would be cured. " Un-
less the buyer comes under one of these two subsections, the substantiality
of the breach is immaterial. If the buyer knows of the defect, but accepts
anyway, reasonably assuming that the defect will be cured, he can revoke
if the cure is not made."6 The buyer may also revoke if at the time of ac-
ceptance he did not know of the non-conformity. The buyer's lack of
knowledge may be the result of either the difficulty of discovering the de-
'dUCC § 2-608(1).
50 See UCC § 2-608, Comment 2.
60 Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Co., 209 Pa. Super. 120, 224 A.2d 782 (1966).
o1 Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, - Ala. -, 224 So.2d 638 (1969).
62 101 R. L 223, 221 A.2d 615 (1966).
83Id. at 231, 221 A.2d at 619.
64 Mahon, supra note 31; Peters, Remedis for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of
Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L. J. 199
(1963); Comment, Buyers' Remedies in Sales Cases Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
11 LAm & WATR L. REv. 419 (1967).
65 UCC § 2-608 1(a) & (b).
60UCC § 2-608(1) (a).
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fect, or by his relying on the seller's assurances.' This assurance can come
from the circumstances of the transaction as well as from express language
of assurance. 68 The assurances usually take the form of promises that the
goods conform to the agreement and that any defect will be remedied.
The courts, that have addressed themselves to the problem of whether the
seller had given an assurance to the buyer, have seemed to confuse assur-
ance with warranty. Thus in a case where the seller warranted that he
would remedy any defects in a new car for a period of 24 months, the
court held that warranty to be a sufficient assurance under 2-608(1)(b)
to induce the buyer to accept the automobile.6 However a salesman's
statement that a car is in "good shape mechanically," and a mechanic's
statement that "there is nothing wrong with this car" were held not to be
the type assurance demanded by the Code.70 In a third case, a statement
by a seller that a vending machine business will improve if only given
time, was held to be 2-608(1)(b) assurance.71 It appears as if the courts
that have litigated this question are using a test for assurance similar to
the test for determining the difference between a warranty and mere sales
talk. This is probably not the result intended by the drafters " although
it is difficult to conceive of an assurance which would not become a war-
ranty under section 2-313. Any assurance must be reasonable and must be
heard and believed or relied upon by the buyer if he is later to attempt to
revoke acceptance because of obvious defects.
Cases where acceptance is induced by the seller's assurances appear to
be rare, more common are cases where the goods appear to be conforming,
but in reality, because of a hidden defect, are not. If the buyer's accept-
ance was reasonably induced by the difficulty of discovering the defect,
he will be allowed to revoke his acceptance if the defect substantially im-
pairs the value of the goods. A non-apparent defect is some non-conform-
ity in a good that exists but is not readily discoverable. Perhaps the most
common types are: 1) a defect that can be discovered only by testing or
analysis, 2) a defect not discoverable by testing, which manifests itself
only after a long passage of time, or 3) an animal that appears healthy but
in reality is not.
An example of the first type is illustrated by the case of Lawner v.
Engelback.73 In this case a woman bought a diamond ring purportedly
valued at $30,000; upon appraisal, after the purchase, it was discovered
6 7 UCC § 2-608(1)(b).
68UCC § 2-608, Comment 3.
69 Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, - Ala. -, 224 So.2d 638 (1969).
70 Hudspeth Motors v. Wilkinson, 238 Ark. 410, 382 S. W.2d 191 (1964).
71 Parker v. Johnston, 244 Ark. 355, 426 S. W.2d 155 (1968); See also, Babcock Poultry
Farm, Inc. v. Shook, 204 Pa. Super. 141, 203 A.2d 399 (1964).
72 UCC § 2-608, Comment 3.
73 433 Pa. 311, 249 A.2d 295 (1969).
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that the ring had a value of only $15,000. In a suit for conversion the
buyer recovered, the court stating:
...the sale .. .was made subject to the right of Lawner to have the
ring appraised, and that if the ring did not live up to expectations, she
had the right to revoke her acceptance .... 74
A similar situation is presented when the only way to assertain conformity
is by an extensive laboratory check. Acceptance might be made prior to
the check on the "assurance" that if any defect was found acceptance could
later be revoked.
The second type of situation is presented by a defect which does not
manifest itself until after the passage of time. A contaminated oil used
to manufacture resin for use in shoes, floor tiles, paint and other products,
presented such a problem to the court in Neville Chemical Co. v. Union
Carbide Corp.", The oil appeared proper and the resin produced from it
also appeared to be satisfactory. After a passage of time, however, the
contaminant caused a reverse chemical reaction which created an acid whose
foul odor "taxed the powers of the witnesses to explain.- 7  The court held
that the passage of time was not a bar to a suit for breach of warranty. A
similar case involving tulip bulbs whose defects were unknown until they
failed to bloom, reached a similar result on similar reasoning, that the ex-
cess time was required for the breach to manifest itself.77
The Jl iron case is an example of the third type of hidden defect. It is
often hard to discover a defect in an animal merely by a visual observa-
tion; and the only way to determine the animals fitness is to use him for the
purpose for which he was purchased. In another interesting horse case
Grandi v. LeSage,78 the buyers sought a stallion for their breeding farm.
A horse named Cur-Non was purchased in reliance on the fact that he was
listed in a brochure as a stallion.9 After 3 months it was determined the
horse was a gelding80 and not capable of reproducing. Upon discovering
this the buyer notified the seller and brought suit for rescission. The court
allowed recovery against the seller saying the buyer had properly revoked
acceptance. 8'
74 Id. at -, 249 A.2d at 298.
75 294 F. Supp. 649 (W. D. Pa. 1968).
76 Id. at 652.
77 Vandenberg v. Siter, 204 Pa. Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964).
78 74 N. lex. 799, 399 P.2d 285 (1965).
79 The horse was bought under a local procedure where the buyers had only a glimpse of
the horses as they were led to the track. They then made a claim on a horse on the basis of the
information in the brochure. Thus there was no opportunity to inspect the horse before the
race.
80 A gelding is a horse which has been castrated, he appears normal, but cannot function as
a stallion.
81 74 N. Mex. 799, 808-9, 399 P.2d 285, 292 (1965); See also Schneider v. Person, 34
Pa. D. & C.2d 10, 30 Lehigh L. J. 416 (C. P. 1964); Barnes, supra note 8; Murray, supra note
53; Nordstrom, supra note 56; Comment, supra note 64.
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The buyer has two more conditions to meet effectively to revoke his ac-
ceptance: 1) the revocation must occur within a reasonable time, and 2)
he must notify the seller. The reasonable time requirement is similar to
the requirement for rejection, 82 each case depends on its particular facts,
and reasonableness is usually a question for the jury. 83  One difference,
however, is that the reasonable time begins to run from when the buyer
discovers or should have discovered the defect in the goods not caused by
their own defects.84 While not very certain language, it does allow the
trier of fact to weigh each case and decide reasonableness on the facts.8
If the buyer fails to act within this period he will not be permitted to re-
voke his acceptance.8 6
Finally, the buyer must notify his seller of the revocation. The Code
words are " (I)t is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.''8T
The "it" refers to the revocation, thus it is no longer sufficient for the no-
tice to merely advise the seller of a defect; it must now inform him that the
buyer is revoking his acceptance because of the defect and that the goods
are being returned.8  Here again what is sufficient notice will depend on
the facts in each case and will be a question for the trier of fact."9 After
revocation occurs, the buyer must be careful not to cancel out his revoca-
tion by use of the goods. While there is no Code provision stating that
use after revocation constitutes renewal of acceptance (as in the case of re-
jection) courts that have considered this problem have reached that result."
Once all of the above requirements are met, the buyer has effectively re-
voked his acceptance and may maintain an action to recover his purchase
price and damages.9
Having looked at the elements of rejection and revocation, and the
differences between them, attention must be turned to the significance of
those differences. One of these differences has been touched on; that is,
82 See text accompanying notes 35-38, supra.
83 Lanners v. Whitney, 247 Ore. 223, 428 P.2d 398 (1967); Schneider v. Person, 34 Pa.
D. & C.2d 10, 30 Lehigh L. J. 416 (C. P. 1964).
84UCC § 2-608(2).
85 See Bailey, supra note 40; Barnes, supra note 8; Murray, supra note 53; Nordstrom, supra
note 56; Comment, supra note 64.
86 Green Chevrolet Co. v. Kemp, 241 Ark. 62, 406 S. W.2d 142 (1966); Hudspeth Motors
v. Wilkinson, 238 Ark. 410, 382 S. W.2d 191 (1964); Shreve v. Casto Trailer Sales, Inc., 150
W. Va. 669, 149 S. E.2d 238 (1966).
8 7 UCC § 2-608(2).
88 Lanners v. Whitney, 247 Ore. 223, 428 P.2d 398 (1967); Grandi v. LeSage, 74 N. Mex.
799, 399 P.2d 285 (1965); Campbell v. Pollack, 101 R. 1. 223, 221 A.2d 615 (1966). See also
Nordstrom, supra note 56; Bailey, supra note 40.
89 See cases cited note 88 supra.
9 0 Ingle v. Marked Tree Equip. Co., 244 Ark. 1166, 428 S. W.2d 286 (1968); F. W. Lang
Co. v. Fleet, 193 Pa. Super, 365, 165 A.2d 258 (1960); Bassman v. Manhatten Dodge Sales,
5 UCC REP. 128 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1968); But c., Trailmobile Div. of Pullman, Inc. v. Jones,
118 Ga. App. 472, 164 S. E.2d 346 (1968).
91 See Bailey, supra note 40; Barnes, supra note 8; Nordstrom, supra note 56.
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the substantiality of the defect required to allow the buyer to avail himself
of revocation rather than rejection. While important, this is not the most
important difference. The most significant difference to the parties be-
tween the two courses of action is that the course choosen by the buyer will
determine who has the burden of proof. Simply stated, when the buyer
rejects the seller must prove the goods and tender were conforming; but
when the buyer revokes acceptance it is the buyer who must prove the
breach or defect existed at the time of delivery.
When a rejection occurs, the buyer is claiming a defect in tender or in
the goods. The question involved is, was that claim rightful, was there
a defect in the goods? Since rejection usually comes soon after delivery
the seller is in the best position to prove the conformity of the delivery.
He has the production records, shipping records, and so forth and since
he is contending the delivery was conforming, the burden of proof rests
with him. Revocation, on the other hand often comes later and after a
period when the buyer has had exclusive control over the goods. The
seller usually cannot know what the buyer has done with the goods and in
fact the defect may have arisen from some action of the buyer. For the
seller to have to prove conformity would be an onerous task; so the Code
logically puts the burden on the buyer to prove that the goods were non-
conforming at the time of delivery. 2 Since the buyer is now claiming the
seller breached the contract, the burden of proof is upon him.93  The
buyer must prove that the defect was present when the goods were sold,
and that the defect substantially impaired the value of the goods. 4
In place of the usual summary, perhaps it would be helpful to take the
facts of the Miron9" case and proceed through the Code sections on rejec-
tion and revocation in an attempt better to understand the workings of
these two sections. Basically the contract involved the sale of goods-
namely, a race horse-warranted to be sound. The horse was delivered
at the auction96 and if buyer was to reject it had to be done within a rea-
sonable time after the delivery. It is clear from the case that the buyer had
no opportunity to inspect the horse before the sale.97 This opportunity
did present itself after the sale but the buyer rather than inspecting the
9'UCC § 2-607(4).
93 Tennessee-Virginia Constr. Co. v. Willingham, 117 Ga. App. 290, 160 S. E.2d 444
(1968); Burge Ice Mach. Co. v. Dickerson, 60 Ill. App.2d 266, 210 N.E.2d 243, (Abstract Only
1965); State ex rel Hawkins-Hawkins Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 250 Ore. 356, 442 P.2d
612 (1968).
94 See generally, Close, Problems of Proof in Warranty Cases, 31 INs. CouN. J. 282 (1964);
see also, UCC § 1-201(31); Bigham, Presumptions, Burden of Proof and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 21 VAND. L. REV. 177 (1968).
95400 F.2d 112, 115.
90 In most instances the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are "knocked down,"
Diefenback v. Gorney, 93 111. App.2d 51, 234 N. F.2d 813 (1968); See also, UCC § 2-328.
97400 F.2d 112, 115.
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horse, put it into a trailer and removed it to his farm. Keep in mind the
idea that a rejection must occur within a reasonable time and that deter-
mination of a reasonable time is a question for the trier of fact. The court
(as trier of fact) made the determination that a reasonable time to discover
a broken leg (a patent defect) was immediately upon delivery and since
the buyer did not reject within a reasonable time, as determined by the
facts of the case, the court properly held that he had accepted the horse98
under section 2-606(1) (b) . Once the court had made the determina-
tion that the buyer had accepted the goods, section 2-607 (4) 100 comes into
effect placing the burden of proof on the buyer. It was this burden that
the buyer failed to carry. He could not amass enough evidence to show
that the defect existed when the horse was sold and also that the defect
was not caused by anything that had happened to the horse while in his
possession. The failure of proof on these issues is what caused the buyer
to lose. Had the court determined that his attempted rejection the next
day had occurred within a reasonable time, he would not have had this
heavy burden of proof. While it would appear as if the plaintiff would
have won regardless of who had the burden of proof; 01 the seller may
have had a difficult time proving the horse was sound at the time of sale;
or in the alternative, proving that the defect was caused by the buyers
treatment of the horse. This would have been much harder on the seller
and may have been a burden he could not have carried thus causing him to
lose the case. The court however, following the pattern of other "reason-
able time" cases, reached the proper result by putting the onus on the
buyer to prove the defect; when he failed to do so, he lost the case.
Thus it is obvious that the Uniform Commercial Code has changed
the general law of contracts to a considerable extent. 0 Part of this
change has come about in the area of remedies of both the buyer and the
seller.1 0 3 The Miron case is an example of how two of these basically
981d. at 117-19.
99 "Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer (b) fails to make an effective rejection (sub-
section (1) of section 2-602), but such acceptance does not occur until the buyer has had a
reasonable opportunity to inspect."
100 "The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with respect to the goods accepted."
101400 F.2d 112, 117.
102 See, Bracucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM.
L. REV. 798 (1958); Cudahy, Limitations of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
47 MARQ. L. REV. 127 (1963); Hawkland, Major Changes Under the Uniform Commercial
Code in the Formation and Terms of Sales Contracts, 10 PRAc. LAW. 73 (May, 1964); Hawk-
land, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L. F. 291; Lattin, Article 2,
23 OHio ST. L. J. 185 (1962); Sutton, supra note 57; Whitney, Contracts, 26 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 3 (1952); Fiegel, The Seller's Liability for Defective Goods at Common Law, 12 MCGILL
L. J. 183 (1966).
103 Barnes, The Sales Contract-Seller's Remedies, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 131 (1965); Cudahy,
supra note 102; Hawkland supra note 102; Murphy, Some Problems Concerning Seller's Rem-
edies Under the Amended Uniform Commercial Code, 33 TEMPLE L Q. 273 (1960); Phalan,
supra note 30; Whitney, supra note 102.
[Vol. 31
1970] NOTES 163
new sections'04 are being read and interpreted by the courts. Perhaps the
main point this case makes is that a buyer cannot force goods back upon
the seller by revocation of acceptance once a "reasonable time" has elapsed
and that what is a reasonable time is to be determined by all the facts of
the case. This approach allows the court to reach a just result in the im-
mediate case before it and also to preserve the fundamental idea of the
uniformity of the Uniform Commercial Code.105
Benjamin T. Chinni
104 While some of the principles underlying sections 2-602 and 2-608, existed in the prior
law, the Code has refined and added new ideas to the old.
10 5 See, Clifford, Article Two: Sales, 44 N. C. L. REv. 539 (1966); Liberman, Opportunity
& Challenge to Bring Commercial Laws in Step with Present Day Needs, 62 CoM. L J. 221
(1957); Schnader, Why the Commercial Code should be "Uniform", 20 WASH. & LEE L REv.
237 (1963). See also, Lattin, Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 on Sales: Some Observa-
tions on Four Fundamentals, 16 HASTINGS L J. 551 (1965).
